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THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: AN INTERSECTION OF 
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY AND CRIMINAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Nicholas J. Maggio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 21, 2018, President Donald Trump’s former 
personal attorney, Michael Cohen, admitted in federal court that 
President Trump ordered him to pay two women during the 2016 
campaign for the principal purpose of influencing the election.1  This 
is a recent development that was exposed during the special counsel 
investigation into whether Russia interfered with the 2016 United 
States Presidential elections.   
On March 22, 2019, the Special Counsel concluded the 
investigation into coordination between the Trump election campaign 
and Russian officials and, more specifically, whether President Trump 
obstructed justice by lying or withholding information during the 
ongoing investigation.2  Attorney General William Barr submitted a 
summary of the report’s principal conclusions to Congress on March 
24, 2019.  In pertinent part, the summary reads that “the investigation 
did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or 
coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference 
activities.”3  Further, the summary of the Special Counsel report reads 
 
* I want to thank the remarkable staff of the Touro Law Review and the faculty of Jacob D. 
Fuchsberg Touro Law Center.  The Touro Law Review staff has helped tremendously in 
editing this Note for publication.  The faculty at Touro Law School has been kind enough to 
guide my writing for this Note.  Without them, this would not be published. 
1 William K. Rashbaum et al., Michael Cohen Says He Arranged Payments to Women at 
Trump’s Direction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/nyreg 
ion/michael-cohen-plea-deal-trump.html. 
2 John Kruzel, Read Attorney General William Barr’s Summary of Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller’s Report, POLITIFACT (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/artic 
le/2019/mar/24/read-attorney-general-william-barrs-summary-specia/. 
3 Id. at 2. 
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that “[t]he Special Counsel therefore did not draw a conclusion—one 
way or the other—as to whether the examined conduct constituted 
obstruction.”4  Instead, Attorney General William Barr determined that 
“the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation is 
not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-
of-justice offense.”5   
However, the summary notes that the “Special Counsel also 
referred several matters to other offices for further action.”6  
Prosecutors in the Southern District of New York are still working with 
Michael Cohen.  Most notable about Mr. Cohen’s admission is that it 
directly implicates the President as a co-conspirator in a proven federal 
crime.7  Federal prosecutors handling Mr. Cohen’s case typically have 
the authority to indict any co-conspirators.  However, it remains 
unclear whether a sitting United States president can be indicted.   
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a redacted version 
of the Special Counsel’s report to the public on April 18, 2019.  It is 
nearly 450 pages and is divided into two volumes.  The first volume 
“describes the factual results of the Special Counsel’s investigation of 
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and its 
interactions with the Trump Campaign.”8  The second volume 
“addresses the President’s actions towards the FBI’s investigation into 
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related 
matters, and his actions towards the Special Counsel’s investigation.”9  
The report details two ultimate conclusions.  First, “while the 
investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties 
to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump 
 
4 Id. at 3. 
5 Id.  Worth noting is that William Barr wrote an unsolicited report on June 8, 2018 
criticizing the Special Counsel investigation.  In it, Barr argues that charging obstruction of 
justice without establishing an underlying crime requires a high bar.  President Trump then 
nominated William Barr to be Attorney General.  William Barr was confirmed.  Barr’s 
summary of the Special Counsel report explains that part of his rationale for not charging the 
President with obstruction of justice is that fact that the Special Counsel did not establish an 
underlying crime.  
6 Id.  
7 Aaron Blake, Michael Cohen’s Plea Deal is Very Bad for Trump, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/08/21/why-cohen-plea-deal-is-bad-tru 
mp-it-puts-him-very-close-an-actual-crime/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d44a53a1ec1c 
(discussing Mr. Cohen’s pleading guilty to eight counts of financial crimes). 
8 SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, vol. I, p.2 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT]. 
9 Id. at vol. I, p.3.  
2
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Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal 
charges” for coordination between the two entities.10  Second, the 
report reads that “[b]ecause [the Special Counsel] determined not to 
make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, [the Special Counsel] did 
not draw ultimate conclusions about the President’s conduct” as it 
relates to an obstruction of justice charge.11  However, the reports 
makes clear that 
At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough 
investigation of the facts that the President clearly did 
not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. 
Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, 
we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, 
while this report does not conclude that the President 
committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.12 
Still, it is unclear whether the Constitution permits prosecutors 
to indict a sitting president.  Normally, prosecutors can try to indict an 
alleged criminal offender after presenting sufficient evidence to a 
grand jury.  Mueller decided not to indict President Trump on an 
obstruction of justice charge only after accepting the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s legal conclusions on indicting a sitting president.13  It 
appears that Mueller only accepted this view because of “the Special 
Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework 
of the Special Counsel regulations.”14 
In 1973, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) issued a memo arguing that a sitting president could not be 
indicted.15  It reiterated this argument in 2000 after President Clinton’s 
sex scandal.16  The OLC contended that the nature of criminal 
proceedings, including the indictment process, would unduly interfere 
with the conduct of the president.17  The memos equated an indictment 
 
10 Id. at vol. I, p.9. 
11 Id. at vol. II, p.8. 
12 Id. at vol. II, p.182.  
13 Id. at vol. II, p.1.  
14 Id.  
15 U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, AMENABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE 
PRESIDENT AND OTHER CIVIL OFFICERS TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION WHILE IN OFFICE 
(1973), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf [hereinafter 1973 OLC Memo]. 
16 U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, A SITTING PRESIDENT’S AMENABILITY TO 
INDICTMENT AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (2000), https://www.justice.gov/file/19351/downlo 
ad [hereinafter 2000 OLC Memo]. 
17 Id.   
3
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to an incapacitation of the president.18  Accordingly, the memos 
concluded that indicting a sitting president would unconstitutionally 
impair the executive from executing his constitutional obligations.19 
It remains uncertain whether these memos are official DOJ 
policies, despite the fact that the OLC argues that the DOJ is bound by 
the OLC’s conclusions.20  Robert Mueller, the head of the special 
investigation, followed these memos as they relate to bringing an 
indictment.21  Nevertheless, legal scholars disagree whether the memos 
are legally binding on prosecutors and the Special Counsel.22  For 
instance, the arguments set forth in these memos are not settled law as 
they are found in neither statutes nor case law.  However, some legal 
scholars have concluded a sitting president may in fact be indicted.23  
No court, including the Supreme Court of the United States, has heard 
a case or ruled on whether a sitting president can be indicted.  
This Note argues that prosecutors can indict a sitting president 
and that the Supreme Court should decide the constitutionality of the 
indictment in a subsequent appeal, despite the OLC’s clear opposition 
to such prosecutorial action.  The OLC memos should not preclude the 
nation’s highest court from hearing this issue.  Prosecutors should 
proceed with the indictment because the consequences of allowing a 
criminally inclined president to maintain executive power outweigh 
the bureaucratic inconveniences the OLC cites in its memos.  The 
abhorrent offense to western notions of justice, accountability, and 
morality alone justify holding a criminal president liable for his 
criminal conduct.   
Further, article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the United States 
Constitution provides the precedential conditions and procedures for 
 
18 Id.  
19 Id.   
20 Andrew Crespo, Is Mueller Bound by OLC’s Memos on Presidential Immunity?, 
LAWFARE (July 25, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mueller-bound-olcs-mem 
os-Presidential-immunity; 9-27.000 - Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution (last updated Feb. 
2018). 
21 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. I, p.1.  
22 Crespo, supra note 20.  
23 Deanna Paul, Nancy Pelosi says Trump Is Not Immune from Indictment. Some Legal 
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replacing a sitting president.24  Specifically, the clause details that a 
president’s “inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office” 
shall allow for a new officer to act as the president until the disability 
(i.e., the interference with presidential duties because of a criminal 
prosecution) is removed or a new president is elected.25  Clauses 3 and 
4 of the 25th Amendment further clarify replacement procedures when 
a president can no longer discharge his duties.26  Thus, if an indictment 
would interfere with the president’s discharging his constitutional 
duties, administration officials should utilize the provisions already in 
place.  Accordingly, the United States government should use the 
framework already in place. 
This Note is divided into nine parts.  Part II introduces 
applicable portions of the United States Constitution, as well as 
Congressional documents, that relate to removal and replacement of a 
president.  Part III provides an overview of Supreme Court cases that 
examine presidential privilege from legal proceedings, such as civil 
and criminal lawsuits, depositions, and subpoenas.  Part IV focuses 
exclusively on the 25th Amendment, its history, and the instances 
when presidents invoked the rights thereunder.  Part V of this Note 
concentrates on Justice Kavanaugh’s writings and interviews 
addressing presidential indictment.  The author will further assess how 
Justice Kavanaugh might rule if the issue of indicting a sitting 
president came before the Supreme Court.  Part VI lays out two OLC 
memos and an OLC opinion, its conclusions, its reasoning, and under 
what political climate the OLC wrote them.  Part VII emphasizes the 
idea that an indictment against a sitting president is a disability, which 
allows an administration to invoke the procedures under the 25th 
Amendment.  In Part VIII, the author argues that granting the president 
immunity from criminal indictments undercuts foundational notions of 
accountability and morality in western culture.  Lastly, Part IX 
 
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or 
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, 
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the 
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, 
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until 
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”). 
25 Id. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3 (“Whenever the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration 
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them 
a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice 
President as Acting President.”). 
5
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concludes with a discussion on the philosophical, political, and societal 
reasons in favor of indicting a president for his criminal conduct while 
he is in office.  
II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
There are no constitutional provisions dealing with whether a 
sitting president can be criminally indicted, nor do the recorded 
discussions during the Constitutional Convention help clarify the 
issue.27  Instead, the Constitution provides for the conditions under 
which a president may be removed from office.  
Article 2, section 1, clause 6, of the Constitution reads, in 
relevant part: “In [c]ase of the . . . [i]nability to discharge the [p]owers 
and [d]uties of the said [o]ffice . . . the Congress may by [l]aw provide 
the [c]ase of [r]emoval.”28  The records of the Federal Convention do 
not provide much clarity concerning how criminal indictments relate 
to this provision.29  Most of the debate around the clause focuses on 
who is charged with appointing a replacement and who that officer 
might be.30  
Thus, the lack of constitutional text, statutes, and case law on 
the subject forces one to turn towards other sources of authority.  Some 
early analysis of the Constitution highlights how our government 
allows for indictments of officials, in contrast to the English system.31  
For instance, Patrick Henry, an American attorney and Founding 
Father, gave a speech suggesting that a president could be indicted 
while in office.32  Mr. Henry signified again, in a debate about adopting 
 
27 Eric M. Freedman, The Law As King and the King As Law: Is A President Immune from 
Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, 15, 16 (1992) (“In 
a system of representative democracy, The Law is us.  Subjecting our highest officeholder to 
The Law thus represents our collective determination to be responsible for our own destiny.”); 
id. at 68 (“Legal decisionmakers should reject the position that the President should have a 
blanket immunity from criminal prosecutions.  The argument in favor of immunity is 
inconsistent with the history, structure, and underlying philosophy of our government, at odds 
with precedent, and unjustified by practical considerations.”). 
28 Supra note 24. 
29 See generally THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (Max Farrand ed., 1911), 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-3vols. 
30 William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 125-26 (2d 
ed. 1829), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendIIs9.html. 
31 Id.  
32 Speech of Patrick Henry (June 5, 1788), AM. HIST., http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/ 
1786-1800/the-anti-federalist-papers/speech-of-patrick-henry-(june-5-1788).php (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2019) (“The Honorable Gentleman who presides, told us, that to prevent abuses in our 
6
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the federal constitution, that a president should not be immune from 
indictment.33  Modern legal scholars recognize these founding figures’ 
conclusions that a president should not enjoy immunity from 
indictment while in office.34 
Further, the Constitution contemplates holding a president 
subject to indictments.  Specifically, article 1, section 3, clause 7 reads, 
in pertinent part, that “[j]udgment in [c]ases of [i]mpeachment shall 
not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any [o]ffice of honor, [t]rust or [p]rofit under the United 
States . . . nevertheless, the [p]arty convicted shall nevertheless be 
liable and subject to [i]ndictment, [t]rial, [j]udgment, and [p]unishment 
according to [l]aw.”35  The first sentence of this constitutional 
provision signifies that an impeached officer will not hold a future 
office.  Authorities interpreting the latter part of the provision are 
scarce.  
However, a basic linguistic analysis of this latter part of the 
provision’s language lends itself to the conclusion that impeachment 
does not preclude indictment.  After explaining the punishment for 
impeachment, the word “nevertheless” controls the following 
sentence.  The word “nevertheless” conditions the entire article 1, 
section 3, clause 7.  One could restate article 1, section 3, clause 7 to 
say that, while cases of impeachment may not extend beyond removal 
from office, the subject of impeachment is still liable to indictments, 
trials, judgments, and punishment.  This is a forward-looking 
provision.  That is to say, the provision contemplates one’s liability 
after conviction.  It is silent prior to conviction.  Ultimately, article 1, 
section 3, clause 7 explains that an officer is still liable to instruments 
and procedures of a criminal trial.  Moreover, one might reason that 
the Constitution explicitly makes the president an indictable officer.  
Additionally, there is an argument to be made that an 
indictment can only follow a conviction of impeachment.  After all, 
 
Government, we will assemble in Convention, recall our delegated powers, and punish our 
servants for abusing the trust reposed in them.  Oh, Sir, we should have fine times indeed, if 
to punish tyrants, it were only sufficient to assemble the people.”). 
33 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/elliot-the-debates-
in-the-several-state-conventions-vol-3.  
34 Freedman, supra note 27, at 13-15, 68 (“Legal decisionmakers should reject the position 
that the President should have a blanket immunity from criminal prosecutions.  The argument 
in favor of immunity is inconsistent with the history, structure, and underlying philosophy of 
our government, at odds with precedent, and unjustified by practical considerations.”).  
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
7
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part of the clause reads that “the [p]arty convicted” shall be “liable and 
subject to [i]ndictment.”36  One could conclude that the past tense use 
of the word “convicted” means an indictment must wait until 
conviction of impeachment.  
Yet, history reveals that a president may be impeached and not 
removed from office.37  The clause does not talk about whether a 
president must be removed in order to be indicted.  Thus, the clause 
allows for a convicted, yet sitting, president to be indicted.  
Further, the United States House of Representatives (“House”) 
authorized Lewis Deschler, then a parliamentarian of the House, “‘to 
compile and prepare . . . precedents’ of the House for purposes of 
analysis.”38  These compilations consist of 17 volumes, 33 chapters, 
and thousands of pages of analysis regarding congressional precedents 
on nearly every matter.39  In 1976, Deschler reviewed House 
precedents from 1936 to 1973, and historically relevant documents in 
writing these volumes.40  Chapter 14 of what are known as “Deschler’s 
Precedents” speaks about impeachment, its origins, historical context, 
and its aims.41 
The impeachment section notes that “impeachment is not 
personal punishment,” but a “process which primarily functions to 
maintain constitutional government.”42  Deschler goes on to write how 
“impeachment does not immunize the officer from criminal liability 
for his wrongdoing.”43  He cites two arguments that claim 
impeachment is separate from the purposes of criminal 
accountability.44  Nowhere in Deschler’s Precedents does he claim that 
an indictment must follow impeachment proceedings or that a 
president is immunized from indictments while in office.  
 
36 Id.  
37 Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, The Senate Acquits President Clinton, WASH. POST (Feb. 
13, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/impeach0 
21399.htm.  
38 About Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives, GOV’T PRINTING OFF., 
https://www.gpo.gov/help/about_precedents_of_the_us_house_of_representatives.htm (last 
updated Mar. 6, 2018). 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 See generally LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS ch. 14 (1976), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/gpo-hprec-deschlers-v3/pdf/gpo-hprec-deschlers-v3.pdf.  
42 Id. at 2269. 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
8
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Deschler attempts to divorce criminal accountability from 
impeachment and constitutional considerations as much as possible.45  
He references criminality as an inappropriate standard for an 
impeachable offense.46  Deschler goes on to write how criminality is 
incompatible with the framers’ intent and how criminal law serves a 
fundamentally different purpose from impeachment.47  Thus, one 
should not look to impeachment provisions as precluding the criminal 
indictment of a president.  Instead, one should consider basic notions 
of criminal law, policy, and moral implications, alongside the openness 
of the Constitution, for indictments.  The provisions of the 
Constitution, as Deschler notes, are primarily concerned with 
maintaining a “constitutional government.”48 
III. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
The United States Supreme Court has considered the 
boundaries of presidential immunity from criminal proceedings on one 
notable occasion.  In 1974, the Supreme Court decided United States 
v. Nixon.49  In Nixon, the Court held that a president would enjoy no 
privilege from producing relevant evidence in a criminal trial when 
citing only a general interest in confidentiality.50  In fact, the Court 
recognized the existence of executive privilege, but decided it was a 
qualified, not absolute, privilege.51  
In 1974, a grand jury indicted several individuals for crimes 
against the government, including conspiracy to defraud the United 
States and obstruction of justice.52  The indictment named President 
Richard Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator.53  The Special 
Prosecutor filed a subpoena requiring the production of evidence 
 
45 Id. at 2269, 2270 (“Impeachment and the criminal law serve fundamentally different 
purposes.”); id. at 2269 (“The general applicability of the criminal law also makes it 
inappropriate as the standard for a process applicable to a highly specific situation such as 
removal of a President.”); id. at 2270 (“A requirement of criminality would be incompatible 
with the intent of the framers to provide a mechanism broad enough to maintain the integrity 
of constitutional government.”). 
46 Id. at 2269. 
47 Id. at 2269, 2270. 
48 Id. at 2270. 
49 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 687. 
53 Id.  
9
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relating to precisely identified meetings with the President and other 
individuals.54  President Nixon filed a motion to quash the subpoena 
based upon a formal claim of privilege.55  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari after the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia denied the motion.56  
In its analysis, the Court offered several principles on 
presidential privilege from judicial proceedings such as complying 
with subpoenas, depositions, and giving testimony.57  Most 
noteworthy, perhaps, is the Court’s conclusion that “neither the 
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality . . . 
can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity 
from judicial process.”58  Among the justifications for this holding is 
the idea that such privilege would “plainly conflict with the function 
of courts under Art. III” in their constitutional duty to “do justice in 
criminal prosecutions.”59  Accordingly, the Court reasoned that “the 
needs of judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege.”60  
However, it appears that such needs do not include holding a 
president accountable for damages stemming from his official conduct.  
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald.61  There, the Court held that former President 
Nixon benefited from an absolute immunity to damages liability 
predicated on his official conduct (i.e., approving of the government’s 
asking Mr. Fitzgerald to resign).62  The Court further extended this 
privilege to the outer perimeter of the president’s official 
responsibility.63  
An executive branch official sued Nixon and claimed he was 
demoted for exercising his First Amendment right to speak out about 
 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 683 (“The District Court, after treating the subpoenaed material as presumptively 
privileged, concluded that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the 
presumption and that the requirements of Rule 17(c) had been satisfied.”); id. at 684. (“Neither 
the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level 
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute unqualified presidential privilege of 
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.”). 
56 Id. at 689.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 706. 
59 Id. at 707. 
60 Id.   
61 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
10
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cost overruns within his department.64  This occurred in the context of 
a reduction in size and funding of the Air Force.65  Prior to the 
President’s statement, Fitzgerald testified in Congress to unjustifiably 
high costs and difficulties concerning the Air Force’s new aircrafts.66  
Consequently, the Air Force reassigned Fitzgerald shortly after giving 
this testimony.67  According to the Court, this reassignment met 
resistance from Fitzgerald’s supervising officials.68  Nixon claimed 
personal responsibility for the actions against Fitzgerald.69  Thus, 
Fitzgerald sought damages against Nixon.70  However, President 
Nixon argued that he enjoyed a presidential immunity from a suit for 
actions taken during his official tenure.71  Both the district and circuit 
courts denied the President’s claim.72  The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.73  
In its decision, the Court reasoned that there is a public interest 
in “providing an official ‘the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and 
impartially with’ the duties of his office.”74  A president would be an 
“easy target” for civil suits given the notoriety associated with the 
office.75  Further, the tempers and contours associated with litigation 
could “distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment” of 
both the President and nation at large.76  In sum, the Court found that 
a president is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil liability in a 
suit for damages predicated on his official actions.77   
Finally, the case of Clinton v. Jones78 is the last prominent suit 
when considering the limits of presidential immunity from judicial 
proceedings.  In Jones, Paula Jones sued then-President Bill Clinton.79  
Ms. Jones alleged that the President made “‘abhorrent’ sexual 
 
64 Id. at 734.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 738.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 749.  
74 Id. at 752 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)). 
75 Id. at 752. 
76 Id. at 752.  
77 Id. at 751.  
78 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
79 Id.  
11
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advances to her while he served as Governor of Arkansas.”80  She 
further alleged that her rejection of those advances resulted in 
retaliatory punishment by her supervisors.81  The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied the President’s 
motion to dismiss but granted temporary immunity until he left 
office.82  The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
dismissed in part.83  The Court granted the President’s petition for 
certiorari.84  The Court held that the Constitution does not afford the 
President immunity from civil damages litigation stemming from 
events that occurred before he took office.85 
In its reasoning, the Court highlighted the difference between 
official and unofficial conduct.86  The Court emphasized that immunity 
concerning official conduct only extends to functions of the office.87  
It is not concerned with the actor, but rather the “function 
performed.”88 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, remarked how 
historical evidence shows James Wilson, a participant in the 
Philadelphia Convention (where the Constitution was drafted), argued 
how the president is amenable to laws as a private citizen for his private 
conduct and a public officer by impeachment.89  The Court 
acknowledged that this approach is consistent with the doctrine of 
presidential immunity and the claim in this case.90 
 
80 Id. at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 Id. at 686. 
82 Id. at 688. 
83 Id. at 682.  
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but reversed the trial 
postponement as the “functional equivalent” of a grant of temporary 
immunity to which petitioner was not constitutionally entitled. The court 
explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws 
that apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an official 
was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the 
rationale for official immunity is inapposite where only personal, private 
conduct by a President is at issue. The court also rejected the argument 
that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with 
the Executive Branch would violate separation of powers.  
Id. 
84 Id. at 688. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 694. 
89 Id. at 696. 
90 Id. 
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Most important, perhaps, is the Court’s conclusion that “the 
separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair 
another in the performance of its constitutional duties.”91  In other 
words, the Court recognized that each branch is charged with specific 
duties.  Further, the Court was sensitive to the role each branch plays 
in checking one another.  However, the Court stood firm in the position 
that those checks should never detrimentally affect another branch’s 
ability to perform its duties.  In response to President Clinton’s 
argument, the Court stressed that the vast and important duties of his 
office demanded his devotion and undivided attention for the public 
interest.92  The Court accepted this premise.93  
The Court disagreed with what followed from the separation-
of-powers doctrine.  Significantly, the Court wrote how the President 
erred in his conclusion that interactions between the judicial and 
executive branches rose to the level of unconstitutional impairment.94  
The Court referenced instances of presidents’ effectively responding 
to court orders to provide video-taped testimony, give depositions, and 
comply with subpoenas.95  Justice Stevens concluded that such 
interactions between the branches can “scarcely be thought a 
novelty.”96  Accordingly, the Court held that the Constitution does not 
grant a sitting President immunity from civil damages litigation arising 
from events that occurred before he took office.97  
The Jones case provides powerful precedent and reasoning to 
support holding a sitting president accountable under the law.  While 
that case dealt particularly with civil litigation, many of the cited 
instances between the judicial and executive branches dealt with 
criminal proceedings.98  The Court explicitly contemplated the 
president’s amenability to criminally related judicial proceedings.  It 
stands to reason that the Supreme Court could use much of that 
opinion’s dicta and rulings to find similar liability concerning criminal 
trials for a sitting president.  
 
91 Id. at 702. 
92 Id. at 696. 
93 Id. at 698. 
94 Id. at 700. 
95 Id. at 703. 
96 Id. at 704. 
97 Id. at 710. 
98 See generally id. 
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Other Supreme Court cases offer guidance on how the Court 
might rule on presidential immunity from criminal liability while in 
office.  For example, in United States v. Lee,99 the Supreme Court 
wrote that “[n]o man in this country is so high that he is above the law.  
All officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, are 
creatures of the law, and are bound by it.”100  The Court refused to 
grant blanket immunity from the law to government officials, no 
matter their position.101 
In Burton v. United States,102 the Supreme Court held that a 
United States Senator may be criminally indicted for accepting 
compensation in which the United States is an interested party.103  The 
Court reasoned that such a law neither offends the Constitution nor 
interferes with the legitimate authority of Congress.104  Elected 
officials are amenable to criminal indictments.  
The Court need not turn to the historical instances cited in 
Jones alone.  Our Constitution provides tools and procedures for 
replacing a president under a host of circumstances.  Specifically, the 
25th Amendment stands as one final tool in removing a criminally 
inclined president if the Court finds a sitting president may not be 
indicted.  
IV. INDICTMENT AS A DISABILITY 
A. The 25th Amendment 
The 25th Amendment assuages some concerns regarding the 
alleged harms to government that may arise from subjecting a 
 
99 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
100 Id. at 241. 
101 Keith King, Indicting the President: Can a Sitting President be Criminally Indicted?, 30 
SW. U. L. REV. 417 (2001). 
102 202 U.S. 344 (1906). 
103 Id. at 367.  
There can be no reason why the Government may not, by legislation, 
protect each Department against such evils, indeed, against everything, 
from whatever source it proceeds, that tends or may tend to corruption of 
inefficiency in the management of public affairs. A Senator cannot claim 
immunity from legislation directed to that end, simply because he is a 
member of a body which does not own its existence to Congress, and with 
whose constitutional functions there can be no interference. 
Id. 
104 Id.  
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/7
2019 CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY 771 
president to criminal litigation.  The 25th Amendment serves to clarify 
the order of succession and procedures for replacing a president.  
However, there is a lack of law or precedent that helps define when the 
amendment can be invoked.  In relevant part, section 3 of the 25th 
Amendment reads: 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either 
the principal officers of the executive departments or of 
such other body as Congress may by law provide, 
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their 
written declaration that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall immediately assume the powers and 
duties of the office as Acting President.105 
Before passing the 25th Amendment, Congress consulted with 
legal scholars to determine what qualifies as an inability under the 
Constitution.106  Congress also considered who should determine what 
a disability is.107  Various letters from legal professionals argue that a 
disability encompasses both physical and mental inability to discharge 
the duties of the president.108  Some letters contend that a disability 
should be defined as what the founders could have medically 
contemplated at the time.109  However, others argue that it is a practical 
matter concerning whether the president is discharging the duties of 
his office.110 
Only a small pool of presidents have had their powers removed 
under the 25th Amendment.  In 1985, President Reagan penned a letter 
charging then-Vice President George H.W. Bush with executing 
presidential powers and duties.111  This preceded President Reagan’s 
 
105 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added.) 
106 H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 6, 15 (Comm. 
Print. 1956), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=twent 
yfifth_amendment_congressional_materials [hereinafter Hearings]. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 15, 17, 18.  
109 Id. at 26.  
110 Id. at 15, 18. 
111 Ronald Reagan, Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House on the President’s Resumption of His Powers and Duties Following Surgery, AM. 
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impending surgery that would leave him temporarily incapacitated.112  
President Reagan resumed his powers shortly after his surgery.113  
Similarly, in 2002, President George W. Bush penned a letter 
discharging his duties to the Vice President under the 25th 
Amendment.114  This letter also preceded a medical procedure that 
required sedation.115  President Bush discharged his duties again in 
2007 before another routine medical procedure that required 
sedation.116  He resumed his powers shortly thereafter both times.117  
The use of the 25th Amendment lends support to the idea that the 
Constitution provides for the replacement of a disabled president.  
B. History of the 25th Amendment 
History suggests that the 25th Amendment’s 3rd and 4th 
clauses are reserved for medical incapacitation.  Even in letters to 
Congress before drafting the Amendment, legal scholars argued that a 
disability could only be understood as the founders understood 
intellectual illness.118  Yet, others argued that the inability to discharge 
duties should extend to practical matters such as motor functions and 
tasks associated with those motor functions.119 
Mental or physical impairments should trigger the 25th 
Amendment only when a president cannot effectively advocate for the 
interests of this nation.  Imagine the officer who cannot walk but leads 
a country through a war and lifts the nation out of an economic 
depression.120  Administration officials should not be concerned with 
disabilities that do not impair an officer’s ability to produce a quality 
 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 George W. Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Temporary Transfer of the Powers 
and Duties of President of the United States, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 29, 2002), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-temporary-
transfer-the-powers-and-duties-president-the-united. 
115 Id.  
116 George W. Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers and Duties 
of the President of the United States, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 21, 2007), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-the-temporary-
transfer-the-powers-and-duties-the-president.  
117 Id.  
118 Hearings, supra note 106.   
119 Id.  
120 Franklin D. Roosevelt- Key Events, U. VA. MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/preside 
nt/franklin-d-roosevelt/key-events (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
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work product.121  Such officials should be solely concerned with 
circumstances that afflict an officer’s ability to effectively advocate for 
the interests of this nation.  If a condition, either mental, physical, or 
legal,122 prevents a president from discharging his duties in any way, 
he should be considered disabled under the 25th Amendment.   
An indictment can impair the president’s ability to function in 
much the same way as an incapacitating operation.  An arraignment 
follows an indictment which forces the individual to appear before a 
judge, enter a plea, and potentially lead to a jury trial.  An indictment 
can lead to an arrest and imprisonment.  An indictment can result in 
compliance with different court orders such as subpoenas, gag orders, 
and other judicial procedures.  An individual is involuntarily held at a 
variety of locations and prohibited from enjoying fundamental rights 
such as speech and privacy when complying with the judicial process 
that attends an indictment.  A president would not be able to effectively 
discharge his powers while complying with an indictment.  
Accordingly, bringing an indictment against a sitting president would 
fall within the circumstances contemplated by Congress and legal 
scholars surveyed for the scope of 25th Amendment.  
Furthermore, there might be no greater disability than death.  
An inquiry into what an administration may accomplish under the 
stress caused from the passing of a sitting president could be gathered 
from the actions taken by the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson 
administrations.  The achievements of those administrations serve as 
testaments to the idea that, even in death, the government can carry on 
in its duties. 
In the wake of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, then-
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the office of President.123  
In fact, President Kennedy’s assassination instigated a discussion in 
 
121 Armond S Goldman et al., What Was the Cause of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
Paralytic Illness?, 11 J. MED. BIOGRAPHY 232 (2003), https://www.ehdp.com/out/jmb_2003_ 
v11_p232-240.pdf 
122 Hearings, supra note 106, at 14 (“These well established rules point to a definition of 
‘inability’ which covers all cases in which the President is in fact unable to exercise a power 
which the public interest requires to be exercised.  The cause and duration of the inability are 
immaterial—the question is one of fact.”); id. at 18 (“Inability is a practical concept-an 
impairment such that the powers and duties cannot effectively be discharged.”). 
123 Kent Germany, Lyndon B. Johnson: Impact and Legacy, U. VA. MILLER CTR., 
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Congress that culminated in the ratification of the 25th amendment.124   
Despite the unexpected death, President Johnson oversaw the passage 
of dramatic civil rights legislation encompassed within the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and budget reform in the Revenue Act of 1964.125  Prior 
to his assassination, President Kennedy prioritized and pushed for 
enactment of these bills during his presidency.126  Still, after his 
assassination and in the wake of such tragedy, the administration 
reorganized and urged sweeping government reformation. 
History demonstrates that a government can continue to thrive 
in the absence of the elected president, and a president can still be 
effective while attending to legal proceedings.  In December of 1998, 
the House introduced articles of impeachment against President Bill 
Clinton.127  The Senate acquitted him in February of 1999.128  Yet, 
President Clinton arguably had a presidency marked by domestic and 
foreign political achievements.  He enjoyed a 68% approval rating and 
a 72% rating among Americans who believed he could be effective and 
lead successful foreign policy endeavors.129  Moreover, after rallying 
the nation’s support, President Clinton deployed troops to Serbia in 
March of 1999, a month after his impeachment proceeding.130  This 
initiative successfully led Dictator Slobodan Milosevic to pull troops 
out of Kosovo.131  This achievement also complemented domestic 
accomplishments.  For instance, President Clinton, a member of the 
Democratic Party, was able to negotiate with the Republican Party and 
agreed on paying dues to the United Nations, doubling afterschool 
programs, and implementing the 100,000 Teacher Initiative.132   
 
124 Scott Bomboy, How JFK’s Assassination Led to a Constitutional Amendment, NAT’L 
CONST. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/how-jfks-assassination-led-
to-a-constitutional-amendment/. 
125 Johnson, supra note 123. 
126 Id.  
127 Daniel H. Erskine, The Trial of Queen Caroline and the Impeachment of President 
Clinton: Law As a Weapon for Political Reform, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2008).  
128 Baker & Dewar, supra note 37.  
129 Presidential Approval Ratings – Bill Clinton, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116 
584/Presidential-approval-ratings-bill-clinton.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).  
130 Samuel J. Sarver, Effects of the Impeachment on Bill Clinton’s Staff, Cabinet, Agenda, 
and Legacy, ILL. ST. U., https://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2006/Sarver 
13.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
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Overall, in President Clinton’s case, attending to legal 
proceedings did not debilitate him and prevent him from executing his 
duties.  One might reasonably point to many factors outside of 
President Clinton’s control that influenced his favorable poll 
numbers.133  Most prominent, perhaps, is the proliferation of the 
internet, websites, and cyber-commerce.134  However, the 
consequences of legal proceedings did not appear to impair the 
credibility or function of the government.  
Furthermore, insulating a president from indictment allows for 
a likely criminal actor to continue exercising great powers in our 
nation’s highest office.  The 25th Amendment provides the procedure 
for an administration to initiate a process which could be used to hold 
a criminal president liable for his actions.  
Nixon’s presidency reflects the consequences that occur when 
a criminally inclined sitting president maintains executive power.135  
For example, Nixon secured funds to bankroll cover-ups of the 
Watergate scandal because of his presidential position.136  In fact, he 
further engaged in cover-ups of those cover-ups.137  These schemes 
spanned two terms.138  However, an indictment could have stopped that 
conduct sooner than an impeachment.  
C. OLC Memoranda 
As previously mentioned, the OLC drafted a memorandum in 
1973 arguing that a sitting president could not be indicted.139  The 
memo explained that the attention necessary to defend a criminal 
indictment would “interfere with the President’s unique duties.”140  
Accordingly, the memo concluded that an indictment would frustrate 
 
133 Id.  
134 See CHRISTIAN WOLESCHEID, RISE AND BURST OF THE DOTCOM BUBBLE: CAUSES, 
CHARACTERISTICS, EXAMPLES (2012). 
135 See generally JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION (1976); CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB 
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974); BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE 
FINAL DAYS (1976). 
136 See generally DEAN, supra note 135; BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S 
MEN, supra note 135,  BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS, supra note 135.  
137 See generally DEAN, supra note 135; BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S 
MEN, supra note 135; BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS, supra note 135. 
138 See generally DEAN, supra note 135; BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S 
MEN, supra note 135; BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS, supra note 135. 
139 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 15. 
140 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 15. 
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a president’s ability to carry out his duties to such an extent that any 
proceeding should be deferred until after his term.141  In 2000, the OLC 
reaffirmed these conclusions with another memorandum.142 
Federal prosecutors are expected to follow official DOJ 
policies, regulations, and practices; such rules are published in memos 
like those mentioned above.143  While it has been an official practice 
of the DOJ to refrain from indicting a president, it is unclear whether 
doing so is an official policy.  Mueller followed the memo’s guidelines 
and decided not to indict President Trump despite evidence that 
President Trump obstructed justice.144 
It stands to reason, though, that an indictment could serve as a 
disability.  President Bush and President Reagan relinquished their 
duties because of their inability to perform presidential duties.145  An 
indictment either prohibits a president from discharging his duties, 
impairs him, or serves no debilitating purpose.  If the latter, then there 
is no policy reason that justifies presidential immunity in the OLC 
memos.  If it is the former, administrations can turn to history, as 
presidents have utilized constitutional tools to relinquish their duties 
when they cannot discharge them.  The argument that an indictment 
might impair the president requires nuanced policy consideration, as 
will later be addressed in this Note.146 
However, in his report, Mueller concluded that obstruction of 
justice laws can apply to the president.147  Mueller relied on a footnote 
from a 1995 OLC opinion to reach this conclusion.148  In 1995, 
President Clinton nominated William Fletcher to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Fletcher’s mother also served as a judge 
on that court.149  The OLC then issued an opinion as to whether federal 
nepotism statutes applied to presidential appointments.150  The OLC 
argued that such statutes should not apply due to the clear statement 
 
141 1973 OLC Memo, supra note 15. 
142 2000 OLC Memo, supra note 16. 
143 9-27.000 - Principles of Federal Prosecution, supra note 20. 
144 Michael S. Schmidt et al., Mueller Won’t Indict Trump if He Finds Wrongdoing, Giuliani 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/politics/mueller-
trump-indictment.html. 
145 Reagan, supra note 111; Bush, supra note 114. 
146 See infra Part V. 
147 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II, p.169. 
148 Josh Blackman, The Special Counsel’s Constitutional Analysis, LAWFARE (APRIL 19, 
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rule.151  In other words, statutes should not apply to presidents unless 
the statute explicitly mention its applicability to the president.  Since 
the statute did not explicitly apply to the president, the OLC concluded 
a court should not apply it.152  
The OLC qualified its analysis in footnote 11.  In pertinent part, 
the footnote reads that “the clear statement principle [the OLC has] 
identified does not apply with respect to a statute that raises no 
separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the 
President.”153  The footnote offers a bribery statute as an example of a 
law which would not implicate separation of powers questions.  The 
footnote reads that  
Application of [the bribery statute] raises no separation 
of powers question, let alone a serious one. The 
Constitution confers no power in the President to 
receive bribes; in fact, it specifically forbids any 
increase in the President’s compensation for his service 
while he is in office, which is what a bribe would 
function to do. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
Moreover, the Constitution expressly authorizes 
Congress to impeach the President for, inter alia, 
bribery. Id. § 4. The Constitution further provides that 
any party impeached and convicted may ‘nevertheless 
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and 
Punishment, according to Law.’ Id. art. I, § 3.154 
Mueller argues that “[u]nder OLC’s analysis, Congress can 
permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct by the President, 
such as suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or fabricating 
evidence, because those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers 
questions.”155  The Special Counsel’s report goes on to note that “[t]he 
Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such 
conduct, and those actions would transgress the President’s duty to 




153 WALTER DELLINGER, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, Application of 28 
U.S.C. §458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges at n.11 (1995) 
https://www.justice.gov/file/20126/download. 
154 Id. 
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that in “view of those clearly permissible applications of the 
obstruction statutes to the President,” a clear statement rule would not 
preclude the obstruction of justice statutes from applying to the 
President.157 
D. Current Supreme Court of the United States’ View 
on Presidential Indictment 
On July 9, 2018, President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh 
to the Supreme Court after Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his 
retirement.158  On October 6, 2018, the Senate voted to confirm Justice 
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court by a vote of 50 to 48.159  Justice 
Kavanaugh provides a conservative majority on the nation’s highest 
court for potentially decades to come.160   
The question of whether a sitting president can be criminally 
indicted is an open question in the Supreme Court.  There is no case 
law on the topic and the issue directly calls for an interpretation of the 
Constitution.  The results would impact the highest office in our nation.  
Predicting how Justice Kavanaugh might rule on such a case is of 
particular relevance today.  Justice Kavanaugh’s published opinions 
on whether a sitting president can be indicted command interest in light 
of President Trump’s legal troubles. 
In 2009, Justice Kavanaugh penned a law review article in the 
Minnesota Law Review titled, “Separation of Powers During the 
 
157 Id. 
158 Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump’s Pick for Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brett-
kavanaugh-supreme-court.html. 
159 Emily Knapp et al., Kavanaugh Confirmed: Here’s How Senators Voted, POLITICO (Oct. 
6, 2018) https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/brett-kavanaugh-senate-confirmation-
vote-count/. 
160 Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 808 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
May 20, 2015). https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/425C0AE29F10AFD78 
5257E4B00767BF5/$file/13-5368.pdf (Justice Kavanaugh dissented that mandated 
contraception coverage in the Affordable Care Act infringed on the rights of religious 
organizations.); Brett M. Kavanaugh, From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 12, 2017). http://www.aei.org/ 
publication/from-the-bench-the-constitutional-statesmanship-of-chief-justice-william-rehnqu 
ist/ (Justice Kavanaugh welcomes the idea of widening the flow of public funding to religious 
schools.); EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2012), 
rev’d, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (Justice Kavanaugh 
rejected the EPA’s attempt to stifle air pollution that crossed state lines). 
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Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond.”161  In his article, Justice 
Kavanaugh cites his experience working on the President Clinton 
investigation, as well as his background working in the White 
House.162  Justice Kavanaugh outlined a series of policy positions to 
improve the federal government’s performance.163  One such 
recommendation is that a president be able to defer criminal 
proceedings and indictments until out of office.164  He argues that 
criminal proceedings would “cripple the federal government” and 
render it “unable to function with credibility.”165  Further, Justice 
Kavanaugh contends that criminal proceedings would distract a 
president from his responsibilities to the people.166  
Justice Kavanaugh anticipates two criticisms of his argument.  
He first concedes that no one is above the law.167  However, he claims 
that the point is not to put people above the law, but to defer litigation 
until after a president’s term.168  Second, Justice Kavanaugh recognizes 
that the law requires checks-and-balances.169  That is why, Justice 
Kavanaugh writes, the Constitution charges Congress with the ability 
to impeach a president if he does something “dastardly.”170 While 
Justice Kavanaugh’s law review article is not dispositive of how he 
might rule now that he is a Supreme Court Justice, it serves to inform 
the considerations he might make in such a case.  
A future decision on a case considering presidential immunity 
from criminal indictment while in office might not fall along 
predictable party lines.  In Jones, the court held unanimously for the 
president’s amenability to civil litigation.171  The majority discussed 
how it is not uncommon for a president to comply with subpoenas, 
 
161 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and 
Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454 (2009). 
162 Id. at 1459. 
163 Kevin Russell, Kavanaugh on Presidential Power: Law-review Article on Investigations 
of Sitting Presidents (UPDATED), SCOTUS BLOG (July 13, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.co 
m/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-Presidential-power-law-review-article-on-investigations-of-sitting 
-Presidents/#more-272711.  
164 Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 1462. 
165 Id. at 1461. 





171 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
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depositions, and provide testimony.172  Justice Ginsburg, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Breyer, who all voted with the majority, are 
currently sitting on the court.173  Added to those three justices is a 
possible vote from Justice Roberts, who was willing to break with his 
conservative brethren in the Affordable Care Act case.174  
Additionally, they all occupy different positions on the ideological 
spectrum.  Thus, a plurality opinion in favor of indicting a sitting 
president would not be surprising.  
On the other hand, Congress could directly enact legislation 
that explicitly allows prosecutors to criminally indict a sitting 
president.175  Under the presumption it is properly drafted, such a law 
may reflect much of the sentiment in the Jones decision.  That is to 
say, Congress could clarify the judicial branch’s role in the checks-
and-balances aspect of our government.  The Supreme Court has 
already opined that prohibiting the judiciary from exercising its power 
in the civil realm, barring Fitzgerald, would be an unconstitutional 
inhibition.176  It stands to reason that the Court could find the same in 
the criminal arena.  Lastly, enacting such a law would reinforce the 
prevailing sentiment that no one is above the law.177 
 
172 Id.  
173 Id.  
174 Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
175 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 367 (1906). 
While the framers of the Constitution intended that each department 
should keep within its appointed sphere of public action, it was never 
contemplated that the authority of the Senate to admit to a seat in its body 
one who had been duly elected as a Senator, or its power to expel him after 
being admitted, should, in any degree, limit or restrict the authority of 
Congress to enact such statutes, not forbidden by the Constitution, as the 
public interests required for carrying into effect the powers granted to it.  
Id. at 367.  Here, the Court explicitly acknowledges that one’s position in our government does 
not preclude Congress from criminalizing behavior and making an elected official amenable 
to prosecution for that behavior while in office.  
176 Jones, 520 U.S. at 699. 
177 Ronald J. Ostrow, ‘No One Is Above the Law,’ Starr Reminds Bar Group, L.A. TIMES 
(May 2, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/02/news/mn-45632 (“Independent 
counsel Kenneth W. Starr, locked in an executive-privilege battle with President Clinton, on 
Friday invoked the words of a Watergate special prosecutor who won a similar struggle with 
then-President Nixon: ‘No one—absolutely no one—is above the law.’”); Kenneth L. 
Khachigian, It Still Rings True: No Man Is Above Law, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 1998), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/16/local/me-13684 (“These are the very last words in 
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski’s best-selling memoir: ‘. . . during the Watergate years [our 
Constitution] was interpreted again so as to reaffirm that no one—absolutely no one—is above 
the law.’” (alteration in original)). 
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Justice Kavanaugh’s distaste for special counsel investigations 
and indictments of a sitting president are well documented in his 
writings and public comments.178  As discussed earlier, he argued 
against indicting a sitting president in his Minnesota law review 
article.179  In it, he reflected on his tenure with the Kenneth Starr 
investigation into President Bill Clinton.180  Drawing on his time in the 
White House, Justice Kavanaugh wrote that a president should be 
afforded deferment of litigation.181  What is more, Justice Kavanaugh 
outlined into the hypothetical, undesirable policy consequences that 
could follow a presidential indictment.182  In sum, it seems almost 
inevitable that Justice Kavanaugh would rule in favor of expansive 
presidential immunity from criminal proceedings if given the 
opportunity.  
V. A PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLICY INQUIRY INTO 
PRESIDENTIAL DEFERMENT 
One rebuttal to the argument that a president is subject to 
criminal prosecution, as Justice Kavanaugh notes, is that Congress is 
charged with removing a president when he does something 
“dastardly.”183  Because impeachment is a political process, its 
 
178 Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 1460 (“But I believe that the President should be excused 
from some of the burdens of ordinary citizenship while serving in office.”); Josh Gerstein, 
Kavanaugh Signaled Sitting President Couldn’t be Indicted, POLITICO (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2018/07/11/brett-kavanaugh-president-
indicted-709641 (Video showing Kavanaugh raising his hand in affirmation when asked 
whether a president is immune from criminal indictment while sitting in office.). 
179 Kavanaugh, supra note 161. 
180 Id. at 1460 (“This is not something I necessarily thought in the 1980s or 1990s.  Like 
many Americans at that time, I believed that the President should be required to shoulder the 
same obligations that we all carry.  But in retrospect, that seems a mistake.”). 
181 Id. at 1459. 
182 Id. (“In particular, Congress might consider a law exempting a President—while in 
office—from criminal prosecution and investigation, including from questioning by criminal 
prosecutors or defense counsel.  Criminal investigations targeted at or revolving around a 
President are inevitably politicized by both their supporters and critics.  As I have written 
before, ‘no Attorney General or special counsel will have the necessary credibility to avoid 
the inevitable charges that he is politically motivated—whether in favor of the President or 
against him, depending on the individual leading the investigation and its results.’”). 
183 Id. at 1462.  Dastardly means underhanded or treacherous.  Justice Kavanaugh writes in 
the preceding sentence that “A second possible concern is that the country needs a check 
against a bad-behaving or law-breaking President.”  Id.  He then writes “If the President does 
something dastardly, the impeachment process is available.”  Id.  One might reason that 
“dastardly” means “bad-behaving” or “law-breaking” in this context, too.  Dastardly, 
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instigation is subject to the whims of Congress.  Additionally, 
conviction also requires a two-thirds majority vote by Congress.  
Accordingly, it is possible that a president can commit a federal 
offense without removal from office.  Consider that President Clinton 
perjured himself to a federal prosecutor.  The House initiated 
impeachment proceedings for two articles of impeachment.  However, 
the Senate failed to reach the required two-thirds threshold to convict 
him.184  It does not necessarily follow that, because a president does 
something dastardly, he will be removed from office.  
A further policy consideration is whether an executive officer 
should be permitted to serve subsequent terms after participating in 
criminal activity.  In theory, a president could commit a crime his first 
day in office, deferring any consequences to the end of his term.  But 
the president does not lose his status before, during, or after a 
reelection.  It stands to reason that a president could defer 
consequences of a crime for eight years.  Note, Nixon won his 
reelection campaign after Watergate. An individual with the gambit of 
presidential power at his disposal, coupled with a proclivity for crime, 
is a threat to any society.  
As the OLC memorandums argue, a president should not be 
subject to indictment because it would impermissibly chill the 
executive’s ability to carry out his constitutionally charged duties.  
However, the Court has recognized that chilling effects are too abstract 
to bind the administration of justice.185  Moreover, the president is not 
charged to carry out criminal behavior. The president is not charged to 
suborn perjury, tamper with witnesses, shoot someone on Fifth 
Avenue, or act for other corrupt personal motives.  These types of 
actions are not official conduct of the office.  Application of 
obstruction statutes (or murder statutes) would not burden official 
conduct to the extent that they chill conduct which further corrupts or 
obstructs justice.  Further, “the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not 
aggrandize power in Congress or usurp executive authority.  Instead, 
they impose a discrete limitation on conduct” with the intent to 
obstruct justice.186  Thus, “the President’s conduct of office should not 
 
MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dastardly (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2019). 
184 Baker & Dewar, supra note 37. 
185 Freedman, supra note 27 at n. 213. 
186 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II, p.180. 
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be chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possible 
application of a corrupt-motive standard.”187 
A final consideration is that enabling a prosecutor to indict a 
sitting president empowers politically motivated attorneys to indict a 
president on purely ideological grounds.  However, Mueller’s report 
deals with this point explicitly.  There is “no reason to believe that 
investigations, let alone prosecution, would occur except in highly 
unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe 
that obstruction occurred.”188  Mueller offers several checks against 
“initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former 
President.”189  It stands to reason that these checks exist for the 
investigation into a sitting president, too.  For instance, the “Attorney 
General hold[s] ‘the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the 
United States Government.’”190  This “provides a strong institutional 
safeguard against politicized investigations of prosecutions.”191  There 
are similar safeguards for DOJ officers and line prosecutors.192 
Once policy arguments are dispensed with, one can then turn 
to the question of whether deferring criminal prosecution serves the 
ends of justice.  Classical philosophers, such as Aristotle, and modern 
ones, such as John Rawls, have provided durable theories of 
responsibility and justice.  Aristotle’s work comports with much of our 
criminal law theory today.193  John Rawls’ work offers a contractual 
theory of rights and justice that one can use to frame this discussion.194   
Deferment of criminal conduct flies in the face of both the 
moral responsibility and contract theories of justice.  At its core, 
deferment of criminal action delays accountability for criminal 
 
187 Id. at vol. II, p. 180. 




192 Id. at vol. II, p.179 n.1092 (“Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of 
Justice officers and line prosecutors against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts.  
Prosecutors are generally barred from participating in matters implicating their personal 
interests, see 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, and are instructed not to be influenced by their ‘own 
professional or personal circumstances,’ Justice Manual § 9-27.260, so prosecutors would not 
frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and personally 
motivated.  And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible 
officials at the Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an 
investigation absent a credible factual basis.”). 
193 See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1987). 
194 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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conduct.  For a temporary period, one is outside the reaches of the 
nation’s collectively agreed-to laws after participating in collectively 
agreed-to criminally deviant behavior.  The nation operates under a 
mutual understanding that people consent to follow such laws and the 
government will enforce them.  The question then becomes whether 
deferring prosecution of criminal behavior is inherently at odds with 
our nation’s idea of accountability. 
The mass of presidential powers naturally attends the position 
of president.  Yet, winning a presidential election does not preclude 
one from engaging in criminal conduct.  Thus, there could be an 
individual with the tendency to violate our laws at the helm of 
government, with substantial power, insulated from criminal laws for 
the duration of his term.   
Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, developed one of the first 
accounts of moral responsibility.195  In book III, sections 1 through 5, 
Aristotle reasons society should hold someone accountable for his 
voluntary acts.196  The voluntary act must: (1) originate in the agent 
and (2) the agent must know what he or she is doing or going to bring 
about.197  It should come as no surprise that this notion reflects actus 
rea and mens rea elements of criminal culpability.198  
One can imagine a situation where a candidate for President of 
the United States considers all the different tools to deploy in winning 
an election.  Some tools are well within the scope of legality in our 
society.  These include fundraising, buying campaign ads, and making 
media appearances.  However, it would not be unreasonable to imagine 
a candidate with a history of violating our laws using tools outside the 
scope of legality.  These tools might include encouraging a foreign 
superpower, on national television, to dedicate its resources towards 
hacking a political opponent’s network.  That candidate might also 
organize a meeting with this foreign superpower to exchange 
potentially compromising material on the opponent for favorable 
treatment in the international community.  The candidate does so 
expecting an exchange of benefits from the transaction.199  
 
195 See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 193. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 For a discussion on the elements of actus rea, see https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/actu 
s_reus; for a discussion on the elements of mens rea, see https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/me 
ns_rea. 
199 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, vol. I, p.181. 
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What is more, a president may be the subject of a criminal 
investigation.  That president then uses his executive power to 
frustrate, interfere, and obstruct the proceedings and operations of that 
investigation.  He does so with the corrupt intent to end the 
investigation.  
Such examples would fit within Aristotle’s definition of a 
voluntary act.  The President would (1) know what he is doing (i.e., 
interfering with an investigation) and (2) bring about that action (i.e., 
for the purpose of ending the investigation).  Thus, refusing to hold 
that agent accountable insults basic notions of criminal accountability 
and morality that attend our legal system.   
In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines justice, 
the role of justice in our society, the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for justice to exist, and its implications.200  First, Rawls reasons that 
justice is “a proper balance of competing claims from a conception of 
justice as a set of related principles for identifying the relevant 
considerations which determine this balance.”201  He further states that: 
(1) people must negotiate and agree on the principles or a conception 
of justice and (2) there are institutions that generally satisfy these 
principles.202 
The subject of justice, Rawls argues, is to assign rights and 
duties and determine what the proper benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.203  It is from this assignment of rights and calculation of 
burdens that laws, institutional regulations, and norms arise.  One need 
not wonder either long or far to find the burdens of participation in our 
society.  For instance, one burden of participating in our society is to 
abide by the laws and regulations, whether or not you agree with all of 
them.  Deviation from this norm leads to accountability under our laws.  
The justification here stems from a set of propositions.   
Laws are an agreed upon set of rules that prohibit and permit 
behaviors.  The purposes of laws are numerous.  At their core, laws 
govern actors in a geopolitically defined area.  The business of such 
governing in a democracy like the United States is negotiated.  One 
might reasonably posit it is as in the interest of prosperity and cohesion.  
Thus, a deviation from such agreed rules would be to subvert the means 
of our collective goals.   
 
200 RAWLS, supra note 194. 
201 Id. at 9. 
202 Id. at 4.  
203 Id. at 6. 
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Further, if the agreement is born from a negotiation concerning 
the rights and duties of individuals, the negotiation would be the agreed 
means to establish appropriate behavior.  Deviant actions offend both 
the process and the results of the negotiation.  As such, it would be in 
the interest of society to prevent that actor from further frustrating its 
goals.   
Even more concerning is the idea of deferment as a 
disarmament of what would otherwise be an effort to secure a just 
society.  Where laws are the swords and shields of just people against 
tyranny and corruption, deferment is its seizure.  What are the tools of 
securing a just state when they are stripped from the hands of good 
people?  A righteous society would be secured by righteous means.  
Consequently, no one, not even the President of the United States, can 
be above the law.  It is such immunity that births unrighteousness. 
It is not clear that actors in our society have negotiated an 
agreement that provides the president with immunity from his criminal 
behavior.  For instance, there are no laws clearly providing such a 
privilege.  Even the Supreme Court held that a president must comply 
with court orders in criminal actions, and that a sitting president is 
liable for unofficial conduct.204  Moreover, the institutions that satisfy 
principles of justice would be unable to do their job.205  At its core, 
deferring the prosecution of a sitting president offends basic notions of 
justice and responsibility which have underpinned the western world 
for thousands of years.  There is seemingly no shred of even a slightly 
redeeming moral principle on which to justify deferment.  Deferment 
of prosecution subverts the negotiated principles of justice and the 
institutions society established to define those principles.   
 
204 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S 683 (1974). 
205 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II., p.177 (“[I]mmunizing the President from the 
generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of official proceedings 
would seriously impair Congress’s power to enact laws ‘to promote objectives within [its] 
constitutional authority.’” (alteration in original)); id. at 176-77 (“In Nixon, the Court rejected 
the President’s claim of absolute executive privilege because ‘the allowance of the privilege 
to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the 
guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts.’”); id. at 
177 (“[T]he grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from 
corrupt acts.”). 
30
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/7
2019 CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY 787 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, along with the 
25th Amendment, provide adequate provisions to replace a president 
when he cannot discharge his duties.  However, two OLC memoranda 
argue that an indictment against a president would severely impair that 
executive’s ability to carry out his constitutional duties.206  Those 
memoranda are seemingly consistent with Justice Kavanaugh’s views, 
as expressed in his law review article, that an indictment would 
hamstring a government’s ability to function.207  Thus, both the OLC 
memos and Justice Kavanaugh’s article conclude that an indictment 
against a sitting president should be deferred until after the executive 
leaves office.  
Nevertheless, the author of this Note presents historical reasons 
that support indicting a president while in office.  To the extent that an 
indictment could undercut the president’s ability to discharge his 
duties, the 25th Amendment provides the appropriate framework, 
which has been invoked successfully in the past.  The United States 
government has utilized replacement procedures on several occasions.  
Additionally, presidential cooperation with judicial orders, such as 
subpoenas and depositions, has repeatedly occurred without major 
disruption.  This nation witnessed the many great domestic and foreign 
achievements of an administration plagued by either death or legal 
disability of a president.  Neither death of a president nor disability has 
impaired the government from continuing to function.  Finally, an 
independent study highlights how one should not look to impeachment 
provisions as a preclusion to a president’s accountability in criminal 
law.  Thus, an indictment should serve as no exception 
Textual commitments in the Constitution support the 
conclusion that a president is, in fact, indictable.  Article 1, section 3 
clause 7 of the Constitution explicitly makes the president an indictable 
officer.208  This Note argues that a prosecutor need not wait until an 
impeachment conviction to indict a sitting president.  Likewise, article 
2, section 1, clause 6 empowers Congress to remove a president under 
certain conditions.209  One such condition is when the president suffers 
 
206 Supra notes 24, 26. 
207 Kavanaugh, supra note 161, at 1460. 
208 Supra note 35. 
209 Supra note 24. 
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a disability.210  The author sets forth the idea of indictment as a 
disability sufficient for removal and replacement under the 25th 
Amendment.  
Moreover, a philosophical analysis of the issue lends itself to 
the view that deferment of criminal accountability because of one’s 
title offends basic notions of morality and fairness that underpin our 
society.  The lack of clear laws and regulations on the matter suggests 
there is no consensus in our society concerning what is a just answer 
to the issue.  Refusing to hold someone accountable for an intentional 
criminal act that originated in his mind and that he reasonably knew 
the effects of, contravenes both the actus rea and mens rea elements 
of our criminal system.  Deferment is fundamentally at odds with 
western beliefs of accountability.  
Most important, there are major policy concerns regarding a 
lack of action taken against criminally inclined presidents, serving at 
the helm of our government.  It is only to society’s detriment that 
Congress could effectively insulate a president’s removal from office 
following an impeachment.  Impeachment is not a sufficient remedy 
because, politically, it may not be possible to secure the requisite two-
thirds vote necessary for conviction.  This serves to keep a person, who 
has engaged in criminal behavior, with the gambit of executive power 
at his disposal, in office.  Our experiences with President Nixon, and 
his proclivity for cover-ups, indicate why inaction against a criminally 
inclined president is problematic.  
The Mueller investigation unearthed evidence that close 
colleagues of the president engaged in criminal activity.  According to 
the Special Counsel’s report, there is evidence that the President 
obstructed justice.  The United States currently has a president who 
allegedly coordinated with a foreign adversary in securing dirt on a 
political opponent.  Further, allegations detail that Russia laundered 
money into the Trump campaign.  Lastly, some accuse President 
Trump of firing former FBI Chief, James Comey, and former United 
States Attorney for the Southern District in New York, Preet Bharara, 
in an attempt to obstruct justice.  Mueller found that President Trump 
directed Don McGhan and Jeff Sessions to exercise their power in 
either limiting the Special Counsel’s scope or to fire Mueller.  It should 




Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/7
2019 CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY 789 
then undermining an effort to expose that collusion, is an existential 
threat to the United States.  
In sum, not only does the Constitution provide for replacing a 
disabled sitting president, but our laws and history support the view 
that presidents can be held criminally accountable.  A thorough 
analysis of the policy and moral implications of the issue command it.  
It is not only permissible, but imperative, that we hold our chief 
executive accountable for his criminal behavior.  No one, no matter 
their title, their position in government, their power, is above the 
law.211  Thus, prosecutors can, and should, bring indictments and let 
the Supreme Court resolve the constitutionality of such action. 
 
 
211 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 8, at vol. II, p.181. 
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